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Unwritten Constitutions of Incorporated Societies:  
A Critical Examination of the Treatment of Tikanga in 
Tamaki v Māori Women’s Welfare League Inc
Simon Connell*
I Introduction
In May 2011, Mrs Hannah Tamaki was nominated for the presidency of 
the Māori Women’s Welfare League. Mrs Tamaki is a pastor in the Destiny 
Church, and wife of the head of the church Bishop Brian Tamaki. In June 
2011, the National Executive Committee of the League struck a blow 
against her leadership aspirations by excluding her from the presidential 
ballot and omitting to send the ballot to thirteen League branches that the 
Committee regarded as associated with the Destiny Church. Ten of those 
branches had been formed the month after Mrs Tamaki was nominated. 
The Committee justified its actions on the basis of protecting the League’s 
constitutional commitment to non-sectarianism.1 Mrs Tamaki applied 
for a judicial review of these actions.
Was this a case of the “old guard” improperly attempting to retain 
control of an organisation in the face of new membership2 or an 
underhanded attempt by the Destiny Church to stack the deck in favour 
of Mrs Tamaki?3 The High Court perhaps thought that the case was a 
little of both. Kós J ruled that it was unlawful of the Committee to leave 
Mrs Tamaki’s name off the ballot.4 However the victory was pyrrhic 
because the Judge also found that the newer ten of the thirteen branches 
were not properly established and therefore not eligible to vote.
The creation of the ten new branches may have been within the letter of 
the law of the League’s constitution but, Kós J found, was not consistent 
with the practices of the League. The Judge’s decision that the new 
* LLB (Otago), LLM(Otago). The author would like to acknowledge the 
support of the University of Otago Graduate Research Committee, by 
means of the University of Otago Postgraduate Publishing Bursary 
(Master’s).
1 “Sectarian” can have quite negative connotations. See, for example, 
Richard A Baer Jr “The Supreme Court’s Discriminatory Use of the Term 
“Sectarian”” (1990) 6 JL & Politics 449.
2 As in, for example, Khan v Ahmed [2008] NZAR 686 (HC) where Wild J 
described at [10] the founding members of the Muslim Association of 
Hawkes Bay Inc. as seeking to reserve to themselves the control of the 
Association as if it were their “private club”.
3 As put rather bluntly by interviewer Paul Holmes to Mrs Tamaki “The 
problem is this – that you tried to rig the election. You see, that was 
illegal and corrupt.” Interview with Hannah Tamaki, Destiny Church 
Pastor (Paul Holmes, Q+A, 31 July 2011) transcript provided by tvnz 
ondemand http://tvnz.co.nz/q-and-a-news/paul-holmes-interviews-
hannah-tamaki-transcript-4333827.
4 Tamaki v Māori Women’s Welfare League Inc (“Tamaki”) HC Wellington CIV-
2011-485-001319, 20 July 2011.
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branches were not properly formed relied on his finding that the tikanga 
of the League is to be given as much respect as the written constitution.5 
The New Zealand Oxford Dictionary6 defines “tikanga” as “customs and 
traditional values, esp. of Māori” and the word is derived from “tika” 
which means “correct, proper”. In the context of the Tamaki decision and 
this paper, the tikanga of the Māori Women’s Welfare League essentially 
means the League’s way of doing things – the League’s values and 
customary practices.7
If the place accorded to tikanga by Kós J is correct then the Māori 
Women’s Welfare League has an unwritten constitution – the League’s 
powers and objects are not codified in a single document, but instead are 
to be determined with reference to factors such as the League’s history, 
culture and practice as well as the written constitution. This paper 
critically examines the implications of the finding that an incorporated 
society’s tikanga should be on equal footing with the society’s written 
constitution.8 To do so, it is necessary to outline in more detail the events 
that led to what the High Court described as “bitter faction fighting”9 
within the League, and set out the Judge’s reasoning.
II Background to the Litigation
A The Māori Women’s Welfare League
The Māori Women’s Welfare League was founded in 1951 and is an 
incorporated society under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908. The 
preamble to the League’s written constitution states that the League is 
an organisation principally concerned with promoting through study, 
discussion and action the well being of Māori and the people of New 
Zealand.
The league has a three-tiered governance structure:
 • Local branches, which require a minimum of five members;
 • Regional Councils, each of which elects an Area Representative who 
sits on the National Council. There are eight regions, with the same 
geographical boundaries as the Māori Land Court Districts; and
 • The National Council, the governing body of the League, which is made 
5 Tamaki, above n 4, at [8].
6 Tony Deverson and Graeme Kennedy eds The New Zealand Oxford 
Dictionary (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2005).
7 In Tamaki, above n 4, at [8] the Court explains that the League’s “values 
and [customary] practices are part of the tikanga of the League”. Since 
the word “tikanga” can refer specifically to the Māori way of doing 
things, it would arguably be inappropriate to refer to the “tikanga” of a 
non-Māori organisation, though such an organisation could be said to 
have customary practices and values.
8 It should be noted that the High Court’s decision was made under the 
pressure of time, see Tamaki, above n 4, at [5].
9 Tamaki, above n 4, at [1].
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up of delegates from branches and votes on matters including the election 
of the President and the other officers of the League. The number of 
delegates each branch has is determined by branch size. Each branch 
has one delegate per ten members, rounded up to the nearest ten, with a 
maximum of ten delegates per branch. So, a branch with nine members 
has one delegate, a branch with eleven members has two delegates, and 
a branch with one hundred members would have the maximum ten 
delegates.
The day-to-day governance of the League is undertaken by its elected 
officers – the National President, the Vice-President and the eight Area 
Representatives. The President is elected for a three-year term and the 
Vice-President for a one-year term. Together, these officers comprise the 
National Executive Committee, which is responsible under the written 
constitution for carrying out the directives of the League and “for the 
maintenance and implementation of the constitution, the League’s 
policies and its rules”. In particular it is responsible to the National 
Council for “protecting, maintaining and enhancing the mana and 
integrity of the Māori Women’s Welfare League movement”.
B Establishment of the three Destiny-linked branches, and Mrs Tamaki 
joins the League
Three of the branches that the National Executive Committee was to 
later suspend pending constitutional inquiry were established some 
time before Mrs Tamaki’s bid for the presidency:
 • The Taumata branch was established in 2005; and
 • The Wahine Toa and Rangatahi Toa branches were founded in February 
and June 2009 respectively.
Although Mrs Tamaki’s argued otherwise, Kós J found that these 
three branches were “closely associated” with Destiny Church “via their 
leaders and members”.10
Mrs Tamaki became a member of the League in February 2009 by 
joining the newly-formed Wahine Toa branch. She was elected President 
of that branch in October 2010. 
C Mrs Tamaki’s bid for the presidency and the ten new branches
Mrs Tamaki was nominated for the presidency on 2 May 2011, by 
members of the Wahine Toa and Rangatahi Toa branches. At the time, the 
League had around 2850 members over 153 branches through the eight 
regions, including the three branches noted above as being associated 
with the Destiny Church. The General Manager of the League contacted 
Mrs Tamaki to advise that there was a problem with the nomination, 
and requested a new nomination signed by two people from the same 
branch.11 A new nomination was submitted later that same day, signed 
10 Tamaki, above n 4, at [23].
11 As the Judge in Tamaki, above n 4, notes at [29], the constitution states that 
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by two members of Wahine Toa.
On 24 May, the General Manager of the League sent an email to 
the National Executive Committee, confirming that there were eight 
candidates nominated for the presidency, including Mrs Tamaki.
On 4 June, ten new branches of the League were formed at the Auckland 
headquarters of the Destiny Church. Each of the new branches had 
between 91 and 93 members, attracting the maximum ten delegates in 
the National Council. 
D The National Executive Committee acts, and Mrs Tamaki’s response
Ten new branches, all springing forth like Athena, fully-formed and 
ready for battle (or, at least, ready for voting), times ten votes amounted 
to 100 new votes in the National Council. Prior to the new branches, 
the National Council contained 347 delegates, so 100 additional votes 
was significant. Naturally, this sparked discussion as to whether the 
new branches came into existence to support Mrs Tamaki’s bid for the 
presidency, and whether this was legitimate.
The National Executive Committee met on 22 June 2011, and decided to 
conduct inquiry into any new member branches exceeding 90 members. 
A further Committee meeting was held on 27 June, and decided that: 
The Area Representative for Tamaki Mataura who had convened the 
meetings establishing the new branches would stand aside during the 
investigation;
(i) The inquiry into the ten new branches would be widened to including 
investigating the three older Destiny-associated branches (Taumata, 
Wahine Toa and Rangatahi Toa);
(ii) The branches under investigation would not be able to attend or vote 
in the National Council; and
(iii) The nomination for Mrs Tamaki would “not be actioned” pending the 
inquiry.
On 30 June, voting papers were sent out to all branches other than 
the thirteen under investigation, and the ballot did not include Mrs 
Tamaki’s name. The election was imminent, and there was no prospect 
of the inquiry being completed and the suspension lifted before voting.
On 7 July, Mrs Tamaki applied for a judicial review of the Committee’s 
actions. The hearing was held in the Wellington Registry of the High 
Court on 20 July, and the written decision was released the following day.
III The Decision in Tamaki
The decision addressed three main questions:
“nominations can be by any financial branch” so arguably the General 
Manager had no lawful basis to insist that the nominators be from the 
same branch. Since Mrs Tamaki had no difficulty in resubmitting a 
nomination complying with the request, this matter seems to have been 
of no consequence.
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(i) Was it unlawful to omit Mrs Tamaki’s name from the ballot?
(ii) Was it unlawful to omit sending ballot papers to the three older Destiny-
associated branches?
(iii) Was it unlawful to omit sending ballot papers to the ten new Destiny-
associated branches?
Before considering these issues, two preliminary points can be made. 
First, although the issue was not contested, the High Court confirmed 
its jurisdiction. Kós J noted that the actions of an incorporated society in 
relation to membership can be subject to judicial review when the body 
concerned has a public or quasi-public function, and his Honour was 
satisfied that the League was such a body.12
Secondly, his Honour accepted that the Association’s constitution, 
which was cast broadly and with comparatively little detail on formalities, 
ought to be construed consistently with “the core underlying values of 
the League”: respect, manaaki (embrace) and tautoko (support):13 
Those values and practices are part of the tikanga of the League and are 
to be respected as much as the constitution is. The constitution does not 
stand alone in governing the conduct of members and member entities 
of the League. If the constitution speaks to a topic, that is to be accorded 
great respect. But if there is a gap in the written words of the constitution, 
a state of silence does not necessarily follow.
It appears that his Honour considered the tikanga of the League to be 
much more than an aid to the interpretation of the written constitution but 
instead an equally respected source of authority for the rules governing 
the powers and operation of the League. Whether this is so will be 
considered further herein.
A Was it unlawful to omit Mrs Tamaki’s name from the ballot?
The Judge confirmed that Mrs Tamaki’s nomination for League president 
met all the conditions set out within the written constitution,14 and then 
went on to consider whether Mrs Tamaki’s status within Destiny Church 
might otherwise render her ineligible as a candidate, either because Mrs 
Tamaki was personally ineligible to be the League’s president by virtue 
of her church role or because the National Executive Committee had 
a power to suspend a presidential candidacy during a constitutional 
investigation.
1 A constitutional value of non-sectarianism 
The preamble to the written constitution of the League states that the 
League is to be “non-sectarian, non profitable” and “non-party political, 
in that it shall not seek to influence the members regarding any candidate 
for public office or any political party.” The League submitted that 
12 Tamaki, above n 4, at [43]-[44].
13 Tamaki, above n 4, at [8].
14 Tamaki, above n 4, at [48].
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non-sectarianism was integral to the League and any deviation was 
prohibited by the constitution. Mrs Tamaki submitted non-sectarianism 
was a guiding principle of the activities of the League as an entity but 
that this did not preclude individual members from having connections 
to a particular faith.
The Judge sensibly observed that a number of past Presidents had 
been women of very strong faith. The written constitution certainly 
seems to anticipate that members will have religious faith: the English 
language version of the League Creed, set out in Appendix A, includes 
the statements “It is because I believe in God that I have this reverence 
for humanity” and “In the Beginning was God / All things were made 
by Him” and Appendix C sets out the League Hymn. If members have 
religious faith, then it follows that they may well be associated with a 
particular church. With respect to the question of whether a candidate 
with a strong association with a particular church would be inherently 
unconstitutional, the Judge found that:15
[T]he traditional values of the League, and its constitutional adherence 
to a non-sectarian stance, [do not exclude] a person of strong faith from 
standing for office, so long as that personal status and faith is duly 
disclosed. 
The Judge found that the question of whether Mrs Tamaki was too 
strongly associated with Destiny Church to be a sound president of the 
League was an issue of voter preference and not an issue of eligibility 
for the National Executive Committee to determine.16
2 A power to suspend
Following on from its first argument, the League submitted that the 
National Executive Committee was constitutionally bound to protect the 
non-sectarian nature of the League and that this implied a constitutional 
power to suspend a nomination or branch pending an investigation of 
a potential constitutional breach.
The constitution contained an express power to “dismiss” an individual 
member for misconduct or for bringing the mana of the League into 
disrepute but not one to suspend. Kós J noted that the common law 
generally insists that a power to expel or suspend cannot be implied 
but must be specific “so all members know what the consequences of 
their actions might be”17. Nevertheless his Honour considered that, 
notwithstanding the written constitution, a practice in relation to 
discipline could determine the legitimacy of suspending Mrs Tamaki’s 
presidential candidacy:18
[T]he usual common law approach might yet bend out of respect for a 
15 Tamaki, above n 4, at [56].
16 Tamaki, above n 4, at [57].
17 Tamaki, above n 4, at [58].
18 Tamaki, above n 4, at [58].
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distinct customary practice or tikanga of the League enlarging the express 
words of [the article of the constitution which gives the National Executive 
Committee the power to dismiss a member]. 
However, his Honour found that there was no such clear practice 
upon which it could be said that the National Executive Committee had 
a power to suspend a presidential candidacy during a constitutional 
inquiry. Accordingly, the League was not lawfully entitled to omit 
Mrs Tamaki’s name from the presidential ballot.
B Was it unlawful to omit sending the ballot to the three older 
branches?
As with Mrs Tamaki’s nomination, the three older Destiny Church-
associated branches were formed in accordance with the requirements 
of the written constitution, so the question was whether their association 
with the Church somehow made them illegitimate. The Judge thought 
that there was “very strong evidence of affiliation”19 of the older three 
branches with the Church. However, he rejected the League’s submission 
that the National Executive Committee could lawfully suspend the 
branches to investigate whether that affiliation breached the constitution, 
for two reasons. First, the Judge had already found that the constitution 
did not permit such a suspension. Secondly, the three branches in 
question had all been in existence for some time, the League had treated 
them as legitimate, and:20
[T]he approach of the League is tantamount to conducting the hanging 
first, and the trial second. The branches are entitled to see the status 
which they have hitherto been accorded continue to be respected until 
the independent investigation is completed.
This second reason has something of the flavour of estoppel,21 or perhaps 
estoppel’s public law cousin legitimate expectation,22 about it, although 
19 Tamaki, above n 4, at [63]. Also see the finding at [23] that the three branches 
were “closely associated” with the Church.
20 Tamaki, above n 4, at [63].
21 The argument would go that because the League treated the three older 
branches as legitimate, it is estopped from treating them as illegitimate 
before actually conducting an enquiry to determine whether or not they 
were properly formed.
22 As Lord Fraser stated in CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 
374 at 401 “[E]ven where a person claiming some benefit or privilege has 
no legal right to it, as a matter of private law, he may have a legitimate 
expectation of receiving the benefit or privilege, and, if so, the courts 
will protect his expectation by judicial review as a matter of public law 
… Legitimate … expectation may arise from either an express promise 
given … or from the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can 
reasonably expect to continue.” In Tamaki, the League’s regular practice 
of treating the three older branches as properly formed led to a legitimate 
and reasonable expectation that those branches would continue to be 
treated as legitimate until proven otherwise. The “benefit or privilege” 
here is the right to be treated as legitimate, which carries with it the right 
Unwritten Constitutions of Incorporated Societies
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neither doctrine is referred to explicitly in the decision. This kind of 
reasoning thus has sound legal pedigree in both private and public law, 
and justifies imposing on the League obligations towards its branches 
that are not set out explicitly in the written rules.
C Was it unlawful to omit sending the ballot to the ten new branches?
Kós J made two distinctions between the ten new branches and the 
three older branches. First, the League had never dealt with the ten new 
branches on the basis that they were legitimate so that there could be no 
reliance by the branches on past practice as was the case with the three 
older branches. Secondly, there were a number of features about the 
creation of the new branches that gave the Judge “considerable disquiet 
regarding their legitimacy”, including that:23
 • The ten new branches were all established on the same day, at the same 
location, at the same time – which happened to coincide with the Destiny 
Church’s annual meeting;
 • The number of members in each new branch ranged from 91 to 93 – which 
maximised the votes allowed by the new branches. His Honour thought 
that “[i]t would be very surprising, if the purpose of branch formation 
was not simply to secure the maximum 10 votes per branch, that the 
numbers signing on would come down thus.”24
 • The surnames of almost all members of several of the new branches 
happened to fall within certain letter ranges – G-Z in the case of one 
branch, and L-W in another. The Judge described this as an “unexplained 
statistical freak”25 but one possible inference is that names for these 
branches were obtained by dividing up a list of names alphabetised by 
surname (which implied a list of persons being divided into branches to 
maximise votes);
 • There was no evidence of actual consent to membership of the League for 
most of the members of each new branch.26 Annual subscription fees for 
each of the 921 members were paid by inter-bank transfer from Te Oranga 
Ake, a Trust which was closely associated with the Destiny Church;27 and
 • The members of the new branches were drawn substantially from 
members outside the regional boundary of Tamaki Makaura, although 
the new branches were presented for affiliation within that region.
This last point seems to have been a particularly significant one, as the 
to vote.
23 Tamaki, above n 4, at [67] (a)–(n) the Judge sets out fourteen different 
features leading to his disquiet.
24 Tamaki, above n 4, at [67] (m).
25 Tamaki, above n 4, at [67] (n).
26 Although evidence was not provided that satisfied the Judge, Mrs Tamaki 
claimed in an interview with Paul Holmes, above n 3, that “The people 
paid their own subs”.
27 See Tamaki, above n 4, at [23] for a discussion of the relationship between 
the Trust and the Church.
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Judge went on to say that:28
Regions established according to the geographical boundaries of the 
Māori Land Court districts are at the heart of the League’s organisation. 
…[I]t is contrary to the tikanga of the League for an Area Representative 
from one region to sign up, or establish branches for, members who live in 
another area. Of course members may move and stay with their existing 
branches. The constitution expressly permits that. But what has happened 
here goes well beyond a modest blurring of regional boundaries. It 
involves the wholesale importation of people into Tamaki Makaurau 
region branches who in fact live elsewhere. 
Although the written constitution did not expressly exclude or sanction 
the ten new branches, Kós J reiterated that “the constitution is not to 
be treated as if it is a code constructed in concrete”. On the basis of the 
oddities listed above, his Honour rejected the legitimacy of the new 
branches:29
I find the manner in which the new branches have been established 
completely contrary to the practices and tikanga of the League. The 
constitution requires that branches be formed in accordance with the 
constitution “and the rules of the League.” That reinforces to my mind 
that one must look beyond the four corners of the constitution to the 
wider values and practices of the League in determining the validity of 
the establishment of a new branch. 
… Establishment of branches in this fashion is not in my view consistent 
with the constitutional privilege of participation in the League. Nor is it 
consistent with the tikanga of the League for branches to be constituted 
in this way (1) in virtual disregard of geographical connection with the 
relevant region, (2) adding in one fell swoop a new group of members 
in size equal to a third the existing membership, and (3) so structured 
as to maximise the number of votes potentially available to the moving 
nominor, who also happens to be a candidate for the League presidency.
IV Critical Evaluation of the Judge’s Approach to Tikanga
The Judge’s finding that the tikanga of the League should be given as 
much respect as the written constitution does not seem to be merely 
obiter, since it was crucial for determining the third issue. If that is the 
case, then the Māori Women’s Welfare League does seem to have an 
unwritten constitution. However, and with respect, this approach is 
problematic. 
A The statutory context
Arguably, the finding that an incorporated society’s tikanga should 
be given as much regard as the written constitution is inconsistent 
with the statutory context of the Incorporated Societies Act 1908. As 
28 Tamaki, above n 4, at [68].
29 Tamaki, above n 4, at [69]-[71].
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Hammond J noted in Porima v Te Kauhanganui o Waikato Inc:30
For over a century now, our law has allowed non-profit associations 
to acquire the benefits of corporate status. Many clubs and voluntary 
organisations have been enabled, under this legislation, to form 
themselves into a corporation, on the basis of rules which they set 
for themselves. These rules are then registered with the Registrar of 
Incorporated Societies. 
Section 6 of the Act sets out the matters that the rules must state or 
provide for, including:
 • The objects for which the society is established;
 • The modes in which persons become members of the society;
 • The modes in which persons cease to be members of the society;
 • The mode of summoning and holding general meetings of the society, 
and of voting thereat; and
 • The appointment of officers of the society.
The intent of the legislation is that an incorporated society must meet 
certain requirements to enjoy the benefits of incorporation, including 
operating within the scope of its rules,31 which are publicly available.32 
This seems to rule out an unwritten constitution, at least with respect 
to the matters specified in s 6, and thus brings into question Kós J’s 
willingness to look to tikanga where the constitution is silent.33 Given 
that the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 requires a society to codify its 
rules regarding the modes in which persons  become and cease to be 
members, silence with respect to those matters ought to be conclusive, 
rather than merely suggestive. Tamaki v Māori Women’s Welfare League 
Inc. contains two examples of the statutory scheme being undermined.
First, notwithstanding the usual common law demand that powers to 
discipline should be express, the Court appeared to suggest that, if the 
League had had an established practice of suspending members pending 
constitutional inquiries, then the Court would have been prepared to 
accept an implied power to suspend.34 Yet, the Incorporated Societies 
Act 1908 requires that a society set out in its written rules the modes in 
which persons cease to be members of the society. The use of the plural 
“modes” implies that each mode by which a member of the society can 
30 Porima v Te Kauhanganui o Waikato Inc [2001] 1 NZLR 472 (HC) at [77].
31 Incorporated Societies Act 1908, s 19(1) provides that if any society carries 
on or proposes to carry on any operation which is beyond the scope of 
the objects of the society as defined in its rules, the Registrar may give 
notice in writing to the society not to carry on that operation and s 19(2) 
provides a financial penalty for a failure to comply with such notice.
32 Incorporated Societies Act 1908, s 34 allows every person to inspect 
documents lodged with the Registrar. Said documents, including the 
League’s constitution, are available at <http://www.societies.govt.nz/>.
33 Tamaki, above n 4, at [8] and essentially the same sentiment is expressed 
again at [58].
34 Tamaki, above n 4, at [58].
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cease to be a member be codified, and to suspend is arguably to cease, 
albeit temporarily. Any power to suspend should therefore be set out 
explicitly in the society’s rules pursuant to the statute. The common law 
is ever-evolving and, despite its distrust of implied disciplinary powers, 
it is perhaps flexible enough to bend to meet the needs of a society which 
respects tikanga. However, the proposition that a legislative regime 
which clearly intends codification of certain types of rules should bend 
out of respect to unwritten rules is a trickier one.
The second example arises in the Court’s discussion of the formation 
of the new branches. In addition to matters listed in s 6, the League’s 
constitution also contained provisions for, inter alia, establishment of 
League branches and regional councils. The formation of branches is not a 
matter about which a society is required to have rules under s 6 – indeed, 
not all incorporated societies have branches - so perhaps there is room 
for a different approach. The question of how branches are established 
could be resolved with equal regard to the written constitution and the 
actual practices of the League. However, branch formation is inextricably 
linked to the election of the League’s officers, since branches provide 
the delegates who vote in the National Council. This means that the 
rules for the formation of branches are directly linked to the rules for 
the appointment of officers of the society, which is a matter for which s 
6 requires a society to have written rules.
The Judge found that it was appropriate to look beyond the four 
corners of the written constitution to the wider values and practices 
of the League,35 and in so doing relied upon the written constitution’s 
definition of “Branch” which provided:
An association of women formed in accordance with this Constitution 
and the rules of the League and thereby affiliated with the League.
It is not immediately clear that this text points one beyond the four 
corners of the document itself. “Constitution” is clearly a reference to 
the document itself. In this context, “rules” could be read as meaning the 
society’s “rules” in terms of s 6 of the Incorporated Societies Act 1908, in 
which case there is no need to look outside the document. “Rules” is a 
somewhat surprising choice of words if “rules of the League” was meant 
to capture the values and tikanga of the League as opposed to the written 
rules –  “values and tikanga” would have conveyed this meaning much 
more clearly. So, the definition of Branch does not obviously assist here.
Even if one accepts that the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 would 
in general prevent recourse to unwritten practice to determine such 
matters of discipline and membership, one might nevertheless accept his 
Honour’s approach on the basis that a Pakeha statute with an emphasis 
on written rules is inappropriately applied to dictate the operation of a 
Māori organisation which emphasises tikanga. Indeed, this issue seems 
to be a symptom of a clash between written and oral culture. The Judge 
35 Tamaki, above n 4, at [70].
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accepted the observation of former League President Mrs Jacqui Te Kani 
that:36
[T]he members have always operated on traditional values and concepts 
and there has been no need to put into law what has always been our lore.
The philosophy of the Act is the polar opposite of that expressed by 
Mrs Te Kani: there is a need to put lore into law, to make certain rules 
enforceable and publicly available; lore that remains lore is not law. 
That philosophy appears to have been implicitly accepted by the Law 
Commission in its recent issues paper on the Incorporated Societies Act 
1908,37 and was also recognised in the now-abandoned Waka Umanga 
(Māori Corporations) Bill.38
Inherent in this conflict are two competing conceptions of what gives 
the League its authority to act in the way that it does. A legalistic answer 
is to say that the League’s authority is found in the Incorporated Societies 
Act 1908, which allows the League to act as a legal entity as long as it acts 
in accordance with its rules. Thus, the written rules are given primacy 
and the League’s practices are legitimate under the law only insofar as 
they are codified in those rules. Presumably, and if Kós J’s approach is 
right, the League’s answer would not align with this.
Instead, one might suggest that it is the League’s tikanga and members 
that give it life and it is the League’s unwritten constitution that gives 
it legitimacy. The written constitution is but one aspect of the League’s 
entire constitution, and worthy of respect, but does not stand above 
the League’s values and practices. The “rules” in terms of s 6 of the 
Incorporated Societies Act 1908 are perhaps only needed so that the 
League could become an incorporated society and should not be given 
undue emphasis.
The High Court’s approach perhaps suggests a desire to mediate 
between these two positions. However, with respect, the Judge has 
36 Tamaki, above n 4, at [7].
37 Law Commission Reforming the Incorporated Societies Act 1908, (NZLC 
IP24, 2011). The Commission states at 15 that “in reality, societies need 
rules, particularly when matters become contentious” and at 17 that 
“[b]y far the best way of avoiding disputes around disciplining members 
is to have clear rules that reflect basic notions of natural justice to guide 
the administration of disciplinary processes.” In context, these references 
to “rules” can only mean written rules.
38 The Waka Umanga (Maori Corporations) Bill was introduced by the 
Labour-led government in November 2007, and followed the Law 
Commission’s Waka Umanga: A Proposed Law for Māori Governance Entities 
(NZLC R92, 2006). The Bill was intended to provide a legal framework to 
represent and manage the interests of Māori tribes and other collectives. 
Like s 6 of the Incorporated Societies Act 1908, cl 19 of the Bill required 
a Waka Umanga to have a charter setting out various matters, including 
the organisation’s objectives and process for registration of membership. 
The Bill was discharged by the National-led government in December 
2009.
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stepped too far from the statutory context. It should not be forgotten that 
the Court’s authority to review judicially the decision of an incorporated 
society is to be found in the statutory framework. Section 2 of the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972 allows judicial review of a “statutory 
power of decision”. When an incorporated society, duly incorporated 
under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908, makes decisions in the 
performance of public or quasi-public functions, those decisions can be 
amenable to judicial review.39 The authority for judicial review arises 
in the context of those two statutes. The League’s written constitution 
should be seen as providing the League’s authority, and tikanga cannot 
speak where the rules are silent. A judicial review is a legalistic matter 
so a legalistic approach to authority is quite appropriate40.
B The contract context
The constitution of an incorporated society constitutes a contract between 
the society and its members,41 a principle which the Judge in Tamaki 
referred to in his discussion of jurisdiction.42 A member of an incorporated 
society is entitled to have those rules enforced as a matter of contract, 
including the right that the society’s affairs will be conducted honestly 
and bona fide in accordance with its rules.43 Indeed, the courts can enforce 
rules relating to elections. “The wrongful deprivation of a right to vote 
even at a meeting of a mere private association is … no trivial matter.”44
39 Hopper v North Shore Aero Club Inc [2007] NZAR 354 (CA) at [4]-[12].
40 This is not to suggest that the approach that the courts take to reviewing 
judicially the actions of private societies is overly legalistic and puts too 
much emphasis on the written rules. The courts are typically reluctant 
to interfere in private organisations (Hopper v North Shore Club, above 
n 39, at [5]) and are in most cases respectful of the will of the majority 
(Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189). What is meant here is that the legalistic 
approach that the source of the authority of the League is ultimately found 
in the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 is the right approach.
41 Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union [1985] 2 NZLR 149 (CA) 
at 177, where the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiffs, who were 
members of football clubs that were incorporated societies, “[a]s such 
members, have contractual relationships with their clubs and possibly 
with their fellow members.”
42 Tamaki, above n 4, at [42]-[44]. Although, his Honour stated that “the 
League is a private body, with a constitution that takes effect as a contract 
as between its members” whereas the Court of Appeal in Finnigan v 
New Zealand Rugby Football Union, above n 41, found that there was a 
contractual relationship between a society and its members but expressed 
doubt as to whether there was necessarily a contractual relationship as 
between members of a society. The constitution of an unincorporated society 
forms the basis of a contract between its members (Peters v Collinge [1993] 
2 NZLR 554 at 557.) New members joining an incorporated society are 
arguably contracting with the society itself, rather than its members.
43 Turner v Pickering [1976] 1 NZLR 129 (CA) at 143; Waikato-Tainui Te 
Kauhanganui Inc v Martin HC Hamilton CIV-2011-419-796, 17 June 2011, 
at [19].
44 Woodford v Smith [1970] WLR 806; [1970] 1 All ER 1091 at 1092-3.
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The issues raised in Tamaki could potentially have been brought as an 
action in contract. Mrs Tamaki, or a member of one of the suspended 
branches, could claim that the League breached a contractual right 
to have an election in accordance with the written constitution. This 
raises the question of the relevance of the tikanga of the League to the 
interpretation of the constitution as a contract.
1 Looking beyond the four corners of a contract
The courts have traditionally been reluctant to look beyond the four 
corners of the written document in determining the meaning of a contract. 
In the words of Law of Contract in New Zealand:45
If the contract is in writing, its interpretation is exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of the Judge. In exercising this function, the Judge has 
traditionally been bound by what is known as the parol evidence rule. 
This rule provides for the exclusion of extrinsic evidence to “add to, vary 
or contradict” a written document. The parties are to be confined within 
the four corners of the document in which they have chosen to enshrine 
their agreement. Yet this rule, of great antiquity though it be, has been 
much attenuated over the years.
The Judge in Tamaki used the tikanga of the League to add to the 
written constitution requirements for the establishment of new branches 
that were not expressed in the text. This is inconsistent with interpretation 
in contract law, unless excused by one of the established exceptions to the 
parol evidence rule: that relevant background material can be admissible, 
and that customary practices can be regarded as implied terms. 
As Lord Hoffmann stated in Investors Compensation Scheme v West 
Bromwich Building Society:46
Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document 
would convey to a reasonable person having all the background 
knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties 
in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract. 
The general rule is that there are no conceptual limits to what can be 
considered to be relevant background material,47 so the “factual matrix”48 
of background knowledge could potentially include the tikanga of 
the League. A member’s contract with the League is formed when the 
member joins the League, and it seems reasonable to assume some level 
of knowledge of the League’s values and practices at that stage. However, 
a reasonably aware prospective League member may not be aware of 
45 J F Burrows, Jeremy Finn, Stephen M D Todd (eds) Law of Contract in New 
Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2007) at 156.
46 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 
WLR 896 (HL) at 913.
47 Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] 1 AC 110 (HL) at [33] per 
Lord Hoffmann.
48 The phrase was famously used by Lord Wilberforce in Reardon Smith Line 
Ltd v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 (HL) at 997.
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the tikanga relating to establishment of new branches or elections. This 
presents a serious problem for regarding, for example, the tikanga that 
an Area Representative from one region should not sign up, or establish 
branches for, members who live in another area as part of the factual 
matrix. That sort of knowledge does not seem to be in the minds of 
prospective members.
It could be argued that each annual subscription payment leads to 
a fresh contract, so a member who has become aware of the League’s 
tikanga should be regarded as accepting it as part of their contract with 
the League. However, this would lead to an unacceptably anomalous 
situation where members with different levels of knowledge of the 
League’s tikanga would have different contracts with the League. Instead, 
it is preferable to consider that each member of the League has the same 
contract: the written constitution.
So, while the values and well-known practices of the League might 
form part of the factual matrix, the tikanga relating specifically to 
elections and branch formation probably does not. For similar reasons, 
the practices relating to elections and branch formations are unlikely to 
be regarded as implied terms of the contract established by customary 
practices. To be regarded as an implied term, a customary practice must 
have acquired such notoriety that the parties must be taken to have 
known of it and intended that it should form part of the contract.49
2 The problem of different approaches to the constitution
It seems then that contract law principles of interpretation would reject 
using the tikanga of the League to add to the written document. The 
Judge’s finding that the values of the League are to be respected as 
much as the written constitution clearly differs from the contract law 
approach that tikanga is, at best, relevant background material to aid in 
the understanding of the written text. It cannot be that the constitution 
of an incorporated society means one thing when it is under judicial 
review and another when it is seen a contract.
The Judge considered that the “inherently public character” of the 
League and the powers exercised made the Tamaki case appropriate 
for fast track judicial review rather than a civil action in contract.50 
However, this is no reason to adopt an approach to the constitution that 
is incompatible with construing that constitution as a contract, especially 
in light of the observation in Hopper v North Shore Aero Club Inc51 that 
“[t]he internal workings of incorporated societies with respect to 
49 Woods v N J Ellingham & Co Ltd [1977] 1 NZLR 218 (CA).
50 Tamaki, above n 4, at [44].
51 Hopper v North Shore Aero Club Inc, above n 39, at [11], citing Peters v 
Collinge, above n 42. Although, it should be noted that the litigation in 
Peters v Collinge arose in the context of an unincorporated society. So, 
perhaps there is room for argument that the Court of Appeal’s finding that 
“[f]undamentally, the jurisdiction to review steps taken by such a society 
is to be found in contract” does not extend to incorporated societies.
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members are primarily reviewable under the law of contract”. The 
codification philosophy of the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 also 
suggests that the contract law approach is the right one here.
C Third parties who rely on the written rules
In addition to the arguments based on the legislative context and the 
constitution as a contract between an incorporated society and its 
members, there is an argument that there are other parties who ought 
to be able to rely on the written rules of an incorporated society being a 
code of that society’s rules.
As legal entities, incorporated societies can enter into contracts with 
third parties. However, contracts entered into by incorporated societies 
acting outside their rules are void and unenforceable by either party.52 
If incorporated societies can have unwritten constitutions, this creates a 
problem of uncertainty for third parties regarding the legitimacy of their 
dealings with the incorporated society. First, it may not be clear to a third 
party whether or not a particular incorporated society they are dealing 
with happens to have an unwritten constitution or a written one. Second, 
unwritten rules can potentially limit the scope of the operation of an 
incorporated society in ways that may not be apparent to a third party.
For example, imagine a third party that has entered into a contractual 
arrangement with one of the ten new Destiny-associated branches, on 
the basis that that branch was a legitimate branch of the Māori Women’s 
Welfare League.53 That contract would now be in jeopardy. A perusal by 
the third party of the League’s written constitution would have suggested 
that there is nothing out of order. It is only when the tikanga of the League 
is taken into account that any argument arises that the branch is not in fact 
a legitimate branch of the League. Arguably, a third party should be able 
to rely on the written and publicly available constitution of the League.
Or, imagine an incorporated society that has broad objectives set out 
in its rules, but in practice follows a particularly narrow interpretation of 
those objectives – much narrower than the plain meaning of the words 
would imply. A third party enters into a contract with that society on 
the basis that the contract seems to further the objectives of the society 
as set out in the written rules. However, the society later concludes that 
the contract was not within the organisation’s objectives and cannot be 
pursued. If the society’s practices are to be given as much respect as the 
written rules, then arguably this means that the “real” objectives are 
the narrow ones pursued in practice, not the ones set out in the written 
rules. Again, this places the contract in jeopardy. A third party should 
be able to rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the objects set out 
52 Cabaret Holdings v Meeanee Sports and Rodeo Club Inc [1982] 1 NZLR 673 
(CA) at 676.
53 Assuming, for argument’s sake, that representatives of League branches 
have actual or ostensible authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the 
League.
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in the written rules.
D The evolution of customary practice and novel situations
Like the common law, tikanga and customary practices are not Māori. 
Rather, they develop and evolve over time.54 Consider the Judge’s 
comments that:55 
[T]he usual common law approach might yet bend out of respect for a 
distinct customary practice or tikanga of the League enlarging the express 
words of [the article of the constitution which gives the National Executive 
Committee the power to dismiss a member]. As I have said, a gap does 
not necessarily mean the constitution is silent. But in this case it is. No 
clear practice in relation to such matters was identified. And that is hardly 
surprising. The events confronting the League in 2011 are entirely novel.
This suggests that for an unwritten practice to be recognised as 
legitimate by the courts it must be clear and established. This position 
has its problems:
First, any acts by an incorporated society that fall outside its written 
rules must be unlawful while the practice is still developing and is neither 
clear nor established. It is not clear why repetition of an unlawful practice 
should make it lawful, especially when the practice in question might 
be disciplinary or relate to voting.
Second, if a practice is constantly evolving then it might never 
reach a point where it can be articulated clearly or really be said to be 
“established”.
Third, suppose we do want to empower an organisation to act in a 
manner that is consistent with its values rather than restrict it to its 
written rules. If that is the case, then the Judge’s approach limits a 
society’s ability to respond to novel situations. A novel situation is by 
definition one that has not occurred before, so it will be difficult if not 
impossible to demonstrate a clear and established practice – the best that 
one can do is to argue by analogy that an existing practice used in other 
situations is appropriate for the novel situation. However, if no existing 
practice is available for adaptation, surely it is better to allow a novel 
response consistent with the society’s values than no response at all.
V Alternatives
Finally, I will consider whether there were alternative ways of addressing 
the issues here – either different actions available to the League, or 
alternative reasoning available to the Judge.
A The power to dismiss
Although the League’s rules do not allow for members to be suspended 
54 See, for example, S M Mead Tikanga Māori: Living by Māori Values (Huia 
Publishers, Wellington, 2003).
55 Tamaki, above n 4, at [58].
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pending inquiry, the rules do allow for the National Executive Committee 
to be dismissed for “misconduct proved to the satisfaction of the National 
Executive” or “bring[ing] the mana of the League into disrepute”.
The Judge noted that this power was not used in this case, and opined 
that “[p]erhaps it could have been, but that is beside the point.”56 With 
respect, the fact that the League did have a power that it could have used, 
but instead employed a power to suspend that it did not lawfully possess, 
is significant. It is at least arguable that Mrs Tamaki’s involvement in the 
formation of the ten new branches could be regarded as misconduct or 
as bringing the League’s power into disrepute. The written constitution 
does not explicitly state that a dismissed member cannot later re-join the 
League. Dismissing Mrs Tamaki from the League and inviting her to re-
join after the election would have been an alternative way of quashing her 
bid for the presidency – with the crucial difference of being an exercise of 
a power that the National Executive Committee actually possessed. Of 
course, that decision would have itself been judicially reviewable, and 
we cannot know for certain what the outcome would have been. I would 
suggest that the argument that Mrs Tamaki was involved in misconduct, 
or brought the mana of the League into disrepute, is stronger than the 
League’s argument that her presidency would breach the constitution. 
It may be that the Committee felt that dismissal was too severe. In that 
case, the appropriate course of action, as the Judge observed, would be 
to ensure that the voters were aware of Mrs Tamaki’s association with 
the Destiny Church and had an opportunity to question her about it. The 
appropriate course of action was certainly not to attempt to exercise a 
pretended power.
B The League’s fallback position: financial status of the new branches
The League provided a fallback argument in case the ten new branches 
were found to be legitimately established: that those branches were 
not eligible to vote in the 2011 election because their members had not 
paid subscriptions for the appropriate year. The ten new branches had 
all submitted subscriptions for the branch’s financial year commencing 
1 July 2011. Kós J found that because those branches had no paid members 
on 30 June 2011, the date the ballot papers were sent out, they were not 
eligible to vote.57 This finding was obiter because his Honour had already 
decided that the ten new branches were not formed in accordance with 
the tikanga of the League. However, it provides a sufficient basis for 
concluding that the ten branches in question could not vote in the 2011 
presidential election – and would give the League three years until the 
next presidential election to resolve any questions over the legitimacy 
of those branches. 
56 Tamaki, above n 4, at [58].
57 Tamaki, above n 4, at [75].
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C Legitimacy of the new branches
The Judge’s comment regarding the law bending to accommodate a 
practice was obiter since there was no clear practice of suspending 
pending inquiry that the law could bend to accommodate. However, 
the finding that the tikanga of the League ought to be given “as much 
respect” appears to be crucial to the Judge’s conclusion that the ten new 
branches were not properly established. I will now consider whether this 
same conclusion could be reached without needing to conclude that the 
League has an unwritten constitution.
1 Geographical requirements and the written constitution
The League’s written constitution clearly places importance on the 
geographical connection between branches and regions. The written 
constitution sets out the rules for establishment of regional councils, 
including that:
 • “A Regional Council is made up of all financially independent branches 
from within a determined regional boundary. The Regional Councils are 
established within boundaries determined in accordance with the Māori 
Land Court Districts or within such boundaries as may from time to time 
be defined by the National Council.”; and
 • “The responsibilities of a Regional Council shall be … to co-ordinate the 
activities of Branches in the area.”
Explicitly recognising the importance of the geographical connection 
between branches and regions impliedly emphasises the importance 
of the geographical connections between branch members and regions. 
From this we can construct an argument that the plain text of the written 
constitution implies that new branches should primarily draw on 
members from that branch’s area. The customary practice of the League is 
consistent with this interpretation, which provides a kind of cross-check 
that this is the correct interpretation – without needing to conclude that 
the League’s practices can speak when the written constitution is silent.
2 The purpose of a branch
The Judge found that:58
In essence the new branches have been established because just three 
members, the aspirant presidential candidate Mrs Tamaki, the Area 
Representative Mrs Bhana and the co-nominor Ms Benoni have decided 
they should exist.
Arguably, a branch can be regarded as illegitimate if it has been formed 
for the overriding purpose of supporting Mrs Tamaki’s bid for the 
presidency rather than for furthering the objects of the League. If that 
was the case, then in a sense, the ten new branches should be regarded 
as being branches of the Hannah Tamaki Election Campaign League, not 
the Māori Women’s Welfare League. This argument is bolstered by the 
58 Tamaki, above n 4, at [69].
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Incorporated Societies Act 1908, which only empowers societies to act 
insofar as they are pursuing their stated objects. This argument provides 
an additional reason for regarding the ten new branches as illegitimate, 
relying only on the text of the constitution and the statutory context.
VI Conclusion
There are problems with the proposition than an incorporated society 
can have an unwritten constitution. The Incorporated Societies Act 1908 
requires codification of certain rules. The constitution of an incorporated 
society is also a contract and it would be problematic to regard that 
contract as partly unwritten. Third parties should be able to rely on an 
incorporated society’s written rules being a codification of the society’s 
rules.
With respect, the Judge’s finding that the tikanga of the League 
deserved as much respect as the written constitution and could speak 
where the written constitution was silent, and the suggestion that the 
common law might bend to accommodate a distinct customary practice, 
are not good law. The same result could be achieved using traditional 
principles of interpretation. The tikanga of the League provides valuable 
background material and is worthy of respect59 – but in law does not 
stand equally with the League’s written rules as a source of the League’s 
authority and the limits on that authority.
Postscript
The election was held after the preparation of this paper but prior to 
publication. Mrs Tamaki was not elected president.60
59 I must agree with Hammond’s observation in Porima v Te Kauhanganui o 
Waikato Inc, above n 30, at [116]: “[T]here is a distinction between Māori 
protocol, and the general law of New Zealand. Māori protocol is to be 
deeply respected, and has contributed greatly to the understanding of 
all New Zealanders as to the conduct of human affairs.”
60 Marika Hill “Tamaki loses bid to head league” (2011)  stuff.co.nz http://
www.stuff.co.nz/national/5560377/Tamaki-loses-bid-to-head-league.
